This is a bad thread.
Nintendo's consoles are actually on par, security wise, with other modern ones -- the Switch has a pretty beautiful cryptosystem, actually, that would allow Nintendo to recover from up to 32 arm9loaderhax-style breaks or far, far more trustzone breaks and still be able to lock hax out of future firmwares (and prevent them from accessing new content). Their security system is not bad, not in the slightest.
Nintendo, like every other company, makes exploitable implementation mistakes that are just that -- mistakes. They don't really happen any more frequently than in other consoles/other contexts.
What you see -- that Nintendo stuff gets hacked faster -- is actually because Nintendo consoles drive a lot more interest than the others; very few people with the relevant skills are trying to hack the PS4, but I can think of >20 talented people interested in hacking the switch off the top of my head. It's no wonder, then, that when nintendo's code is subject to far, far higher levels of scrutiny that its mistakes are noticed more quickly.
They didn't "decide" to only check part of the signature -- they made a totally reasonable mistake in forgetting to remove a debugging fallback path from their signature parsing code prior to 1.0.0 from the image burnt into the hardware, and we found a way to exploit the parser into using the debug path by brute forcing a signature that signaled to the bootrom parser appropriately. Big difference.
Please do give more examples, I'd be happy to refute them.
